DECLASSIFIED

E/AN:ECRodriguez:amp
(Drafting Office and Officer)

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED BY
DATE MAY 25
RDS or XDS EXT. DATE 30-6
TS AUTH. DATE PERSON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS
DECLASSIFIED RELEASABLE
REMARKS DOWNGRADE
FR or FOI EXEMPTIONS
FLO-PBR

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: MAY 25

SUBJECT: United States-Italian Aviation Negotiations, Washington, D. C.- First Session (February 20, 1967; 2:30 p.m.)

PARTICIPANTS: The official delegation designated by the Italian Government and the United States Government respectively were as listed below. Appendix A indicates the persons present at each session.

COPIES TO:

MAR 20 1971

ITALIAN DELEGATION

Ambassador Benedetto Capomazza, Chief of the Delegation
General Felice Santini, Director General of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Transportation
Dr. Ugo Morabito, Commercial Minister of the Italian Embassy
Counselor Maurizio Varalda, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Commercial Counselor Marcello Serafini, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Angelo Caruso, Office of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Transportation
Col. Leonida Quercietto, Office of the Civil Aviation, Ministry of Transportation
Dr. Girolamo Contestabile, Office of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Transportation
Prof. Antonio Malintoppi, University Professor and Legal Expert
Dr. Mario Fugazzola, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Pietro Venturini, Secretary General of ALITALIA Airline, Observer

UNITED STATES DELEGATION

Mr. Frank E. Loy, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation & Telecommunications, Department of State
Mr. G. Joseph Minetti, Member, Civil Aeronautics Board
Mr. Joseph C. Watson, Director, Bureau of International Affairs Civil Aeronautics Board
Mr. Wells Stabler, Country Director Italy, Swiss, Austrian Affairs, Department of State
Mr. Elias Rodriguez, Foreign Affairs Officer, Aviation Negotiations Division, Department of State
Mr. Philip Patman, Attorney, Legal Advisor's Office, Department of State
Mr. Rosario Scibilia, Chief, Geographic Area III, Bureau of International Affairs
Mr. James Landry, Vice President-International, Air Transport Association, Observer

FORM DS-1254
3-61

PREPARED BY S/S

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DECLASSIFIED

GPO 908992

DECLASSIFIED

COPIES TO: E
TT
OA
AN
AIS
CAB (4 copies)
L/E

Amembassy ROME
Amembassy PARIS
Mr. Lister, Department of Transportation
OA Files (2)

Mr. Loy: I want to welcome you to Washington. On behalf of the US Delegation I want you to know that we are happy to see you and are anxious to begin these negotiations. We have a rather important and difficult job ahead and since we did have a preliminary session in Rome I would like to spend as little time as possible on preliminaries. It seems to me we want to move ahead, and to conduct our discussions with frankness and mutual understanding. We will also need some patience. I think the meeting in Rome was useful. I will come back to some doubts I brought back with me from Rome, but altogether I think it was important that we met. You thought it important to clarify why you felt it necessary to denounce the air agreement. That was useful for us. We on our part thought it important to set forth some of the historical circumstances which led to that denunciation as we saw them. I am hopeful that that phase of our talks is behind us and I will not refer now to those remarks in order not to be repetitious. So let's start where we left off in January.

Introduction
Reference to
Preliminary
Meeting

I think we tend to stress the difficulties between us, and that is logical, but I would like to stress for a moment two things. First, we do have some mutual and parallel interests. Air traffic between Italy and the US is large and it is in our interest that it be efficient and that it grow. So I think we both have an interest in an agreement which will permit full exploitation of the market and that will contribute to that growth. In the next decade the world air traffic is expected to triple. It is important that our countries be able to participate in that growth and that our carriers be able to share in that traffic. I stress that because it distinguishes these conversations we will have today from some we have had from time to time, and I guess some you have had from time to time, with other countries that are not able to share either in the present traffic or to share in its growth. In my opinion that is an important difference to keep in mind.

Parallel
Interests

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Role of Air Transport

The second thing I think we have in common is our interest in providing facilities for all travelers, for tourists, for students visiting the universities, to enable our diplomats to meet and our businessmen to trade. That is a very active and very natural contact and relationship we have. I hope that in these talks we will help make that exchange simpler rather than more difficult.

Past Irritations

Our aviation relations also constitute a problem that we both have had. I don't know if we can solve it, but it is our intention to try to solve it. We must try to eliminate, if we can, the differences in aviation that have been a source of irritation between our two countties. We are prepared to try very hard. We assume that those irritations are not pleasant for you and they are not pleasant for us. That is why we have taken these discussions so seriously and are prepared to consider our problems in great depth.

Constancy Of USG Air Policy

I want to spend a moment or two on where we will try to go in these talks. I think that it is important to reiterate some things even though there may be some repetition. United States aviation policy is and has to remain constant and well-defined. We are reluctant to make substantial changes in that policy with respect to particular countries because to deviate would erode the entire pattern. We have agreements with some 62 countries, and we feel that if we did not have a pattern relatively constant and well-defined, we would be at sea. I think sometimes it is not clear how constant and well-defined our policy is. In some respects uncertainty as to how constant our policy is can be troublesome, because it makes bilateral talks more difficult and in some cases agreement becomes more difficult. This policy is not a luxury with us. If we do not have a readily discernible pattern in our aviation relations with other countries, we would be lost. One of our objectives is to conclude all our air agreements in that discernible pattern.

Constant Route Criteria

It is our belief that we must also have a discernible and consistent criterion for the exchange of routes. These standards are not rigid and fast for all time, but again we cannot ignore the pattern or ignore the effect of one agreement on our other relations whenever we discuss a route arrangement. So a second objective is to have these talks be consistent with that pattern by using the criterion we have set up for ourselves in other route discussions.

Carrier Incentive

The third objective, after we have reached an agreement and have services in operation, is to maintain some element which will give incentive to the carriers to make the service good and to make the service economical. We think that a measure of competition is a good means of achieving this.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

USG committment to Aviation Policies

To some extent perhaps none of this is considered by you as important. These factors are not only objectives for us but in some ways they are limitations for us, and I thought it desirable to mention them at the outset. I mention it particularly because I don't think it is wise to begin these talks without being fully aware of the strength of our commitment to these conceptions. We have adopted them, we have examined them frequently, and we are quite committed to them.

Tasks for Negotiations

Turning to the immediate job at hand, we have between us to try to work out an agreement and to agree upon an exchange of routes. The agreement itself will provide for capacity, and the other policy issues involved.

Standard US draft agreement

In order to get negotiations moving we have exchanged two documents prior to sitting down today. One is a route description and the other is a draft agreement. I think there are some things I have to say about that. First, what we gave to you in our draft agreement has no surprises. It essentially contains nothing that was designed especially for bargaining purposes. It contains nothing which is not in agreements that we have made with others in similar situations. It is almost identical with an agreement we concluded with Austria in June of last year. While some of the language is slightly different here and there, it is very much in the pattern of agreements which we have with essentially all countries.

USG Route Objectives Well Known

The route objectives which we transmitted to you also contain, I think, no surprises and indeed those objectives were suggested in our talks in Rome. Our proposed route structure was not expanded for bargaining purposes. It contains essentially what we have to have if this agreement is to be attractive to us.

Italian proposals surprising

Now, I say this because it is my feeling that the documents received from you were proposed on a somewhat different basis. Your route description, which involves 9 US cities aside from beyond rights to Mexico, Panama, and Japan, contains traffic rights in a scope which is unparalleled in our arrangements with others. Aside from Mexico and Canada no other country serves that number of points in continental US or has that kind of pattern. I guess I didn't really expect the route description you sent us to be the rock bottom proposal which you would accept, but I want to underline my feeling that what you gave us is totally out of the question and makes it hard to begin. I think it is also fair to say we were

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

somewhat taken aback by your draft agreement. In it you ask us to repudiate our Bermuda principles, you ask us to relinquish our right to designate a number of carriers, and, although this is not totally clear, you also apparently ask us to treat all-cargo services separately. I hope you realize that we are not going to do that.

Problems Presented by Italian Draft Agreement

Let me put it this way, several things strike me about the documents you gave us, and I am not talking about technicalities or drafting, but matters that go to the root of the agreement. First, the agreement as it was presented asks that we make an arrangement with Italy, a major aviation partner with us, which is radically different from any arrangement we have with other comparable aviation partners. You say that in one sense that is not a sin. As I tried to explain earlier, it would seem to us that it would be a great risk. Second, your draft agreement asks us to make an agreement predicated on a fear of excessive US competition, of unreasonable US operations to or through Italy, a fear of swamping, and the like. Now if our aviation history in the last decade gave any credence or justification for that, then, of course, we would be prepared to say that while this may be impossible for us to grant I understand why you asked it. But that is not the fact. This assumed ability to swamp, assumed ability to overwhelm, assumed ability to deal a body blow, presumably has been in existence ever since 1948. Yet, the fact is that the growth of Alitalia has been substantially more rapid than our growth, understandably so because it started from a much lower base. The fact is that Alitalia, as we see it, carries more passengers between the US and Italy than our carriers do, and it carries more freight than our carriers do. The future of Alitalia is bright. Alitalia's future is limitless, as is perhaps demonstrated by Alitalia's equipment purchases. A good deal of that future is based on North Atlantic traffic. We are fully aware of that, so the suggestions inherent in your document strike us as difficult. First, because your proposals ask us to do things we have not done with others, ask us to repudiate the Bermuda principles which have served us well. Second, they surprised us because they seem to ignore the enormous growth of Alitalia. Third, these great demands are contained in an agreement which asks for substantial new route benefits.

Frankly, that seems to us to be a deal we cannot make. It seems to me to be somewhat insane. At the same time that we would grant new route benefits, we would cut the heart out of our Bermuda principles. On the basis of an agreement along the lines of the draft proposed by the Italian Delegation,

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DECLASSIFIED

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DECLASSIFIED

I don't see how even the present route structure could be maintained. I don't see how we could consider an expansion. I have to be quite honest when I say that what we received from you depressed me considerably and gives us a great deal of difficulty in figuring out how to proceed.

USG Limitations

I have tried, Mr. Ambassador, to give you a fairly honest reaction to the draft agreement we received, and have tried to make it clear to you, as I tried to make it clear to you in Rome, that I am not authorized to cut the heart out of Bermuda, to relinquish multiple designations, to repudiate basic principles of the American aviation policy. Maybe our position is foolish, maybe we are being unduly doctrinaire, or Calvinist, who knows. We do have a world-wide air transport system which we think makes some sense. We feel that in our interest, not in any big brother concept, we owe it to ourselves to recognize our self-interest and to apply our principles. That is why I want to stress to you we are not going to make any fundamental changes.

I have not said these things to make it difficult, or to limit you in any way from proposing what you think. I have thought rather carefully about what I have said. In view of the strong reactions on this side of the ocean to the documents received from you, that I want to be absolutely clear in telling you our limitations. It is my hope that within the context of our limitations and of your limitations we can find some agreement that is fair and sound and mutually acceptable. I guess that is about all I have to say at this moment, Mr. Ambassador.

Italian Delegation Not Scared

Ambassador Capomazza: Mr. Loy, you are naturally a brilliant orator and perfectly in command of your subject. You should be able to scare any negotiator. I think I should be a little bit scared, but this would betray my faith in the friendship between our two countries. Although you did underline large differences of approach that we have to overcome to conclude this new agreement, I don't think we have reason to be discouraged. If you are Calvinistic we may be Catholic. Frankly, I think we have to be able to get really down to business.

I suggested to you in my letter that we follow a certain pattern of discussion which seemed to me simplified a little bit the problem. If we stay on this high level which you have indicated, I am afraid we would remain there. So I think we will have to have the courage to start with more practical things.

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

We presented you with a route schedule. Why? Because you know, as we said before, we have been very unhappy with the working of the old agreement. Now, you seem to be incredibly astonished at our request. Please think a little bit, what have we asked? Let us not talk so much about points in the US. We have asked to go to Los Angeles or San Francisco. We have indicated a route to Japan, and we have asked to go beyond the United States to Mexico and Panama. Now on paper we already got from you 75% of this nine years ago, because we got a route from Montreal to Los Angeles and traffic rights beyond New York. You said we are not going to speak of past history, but the fact is we have had these rights on paper. You say Alitalia has become strong. I agree. However, we do not see why Alitalia should not be able to do the things the Germans, the Japanese, the French, etc., do in their air relations with you. My proposal is a better approach. First we can discuss routes, second capacity and then we may perhaps find that after all, in specific terms, our differences are not so enormous.

Italian Route Request Large Historical.

You mention that we are wanting to have special arrangements for the all-cargo services. We already have. We have reason to believe that you have made other practical arrangements about capacity with other countries. Your airlines fly to London from New York, but they never fly from London to Rome. Why not? If you examine our relations from this very high philosophical peak, then you may think that the difference between us is enormous. We are really not far apart.

All-Cargo Services

We said in Rome that in order to make our route schedules more balanced, we wanted the points to be specified. We did not want the general expression "and beyond". But your route objectives speak only of five parts of the world. We don't want to restrict the activities of your carriers, but we don't want to give you a blank check. We want you to fly to Italy, to use our good geographic position, to take as many passengers as possible, but we want to know in a definite way where these planes are going. We don't want to be notified every other day of changes that we have to accept. I don't see why we can't bridge our differences if we follow this approach little by little.

Don't Want Unspecified Routes

You say in your route objectives that you are more or less satisfied with your present situation. Well, we were not satisfied and we are not satisfied with our present arrangements. This is why we took the hard decision to denounce. If you think this is a good method, I suggest we take our route schedule and you start telling us your objectives. We would like to know what you think of our aspirations to fly from the West Coast to Japan, to have the right to fly from New York to

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Mexico for which we have waited 8 years. This would give us food for thought.

We gave you a draft treaty. We know it is different from yours but we think the correct order of priorities is routes, and then capacity. If we proceed in this order perhaps we will see that our differences are not too great. Let's not be scared by Mr. Loy's observations; and let's get down to business in a friendly way.

Must Resolve Routes First

Mr. Loy: Mr. Ambassador, I really was not trying to scare, but to clarify. I am going to be possibly a bit repetitious. Without commenting for the moment on the order of events which you were discussing, let me say you made it quite clear both in Rome and here that you are not satisfied with your route arrangement and you are not surprised that we are satisfied. We said in Rome we had some difficulty with your reasoning, but were prepared to consider it, and we are. We are prepared to discuss the issues raised by your route request The point I was trying to make is that you complicate your life and ours when in the same breath and at the same time and same occasion, you try to chop our routes down to a more manageable size and to ask us to renounce some fairly basic objectives. We understand your position, although without saying for the moment that we sympathize with it, we are prepared to discuss your lack of happiness with the route potentials, with the operations under present arrangements. We are prepared to discuss that in the next several days. But, when we analyze the situation we see it a bit like this: conceivably under optimum conditions under which we have greater flexibility for our operators and a satisfactory agreement, we could extend the route opportunities available to the Italian carrier under our agreement. But it is very hard to get to that point when it is not clear, on the contrary unclear, that we could extend these opportunities at all in this quite unsatisfactory package, with other parts of the package being a reduction of our route opportunities, and a deep inroad into our basic aviation objectives. You can talk about having to get off the high road, but on the other hand it does not do much good to get off the high road unless we know what it means. That is why I thought it important to understand the entire package.

Need for Balanced Agreement

We can't see the outline of such a package with which we would be satisfied, in the draft agreement which you sent us. I am not interested in exploring necessarily in great depth these philosophical issues, as you called them, but I think we are interested in making it clear that without a very satisfactory on those the rest is an exercise which may turn out to be quite meaningless. Our feeling is strengthened not only because we

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

feel that our policy has operated very well for everyone, but also by our honest feeling that the changes you propose are neither sound nor necessary for the health of the Italian carrier.

US-UK Agreement is balanced

Let me say one more thing. You refer to our agreement with the UK. There are a lot of things about that agreement we don't like and hopefully there are some things the UK does not like. But essentially we are very happy with that agreement and were very happy with the 1946 agreement, and that is an agreement which does not have any capacity limitation. That is an agreement under which three of our carriers serve the UK. We don't serve all the points beyond that we would like to serve because that is the deal we made on the routes. But, it seems to me, if you look at the UK agreement, it is an example of what can be achieved under the Bermuda agreement.

USG Constancy To Bermuda Agreements

The propriety of international negotiations forces me to profess some ignorance of the subject matter which you are talking about when you say that we have made some non-Bermuda type arrangements. It is a fact that we have with one of our friends made an agreement, not all of which is public, which involves deferral of the full impact of the competition envisaged by Bermuda. Most of you are familiar with this, but I hope you will not misread the significance of this. I don't think that it is wise to underestimate the faithfulness with which we have followed our principles. It does not mean we have never made an arrangement other than full Bermuda, but there is no situation which would be a precedent for the kind of arrangement that I understand is suggested by your document. It is important to distinguish between the rule and the exception. There is absolutely no question in our minds where the distinction lies in this situation. Also, it is important to distinguish between a major and a minor airline.

Maybe that is all I want to say for the immediate moment, except to reiterate that this would be a tough bridge for us to get over, and it is very troublesome for us.

Italian Proposal on Customs

Ambassador Capomazza: Before I take up the subject again, I would like to bring up a collateral subject which I think is of interest to both of us. It is this: In the last agreement the so-called customs clause, which is going to expire on May 31, may cause us both some headaches. You have a system that permits you to grant an airline some customs exemptions on gas, spare parts, etc., on the basis of reciprocity. We, on the contrary, can grant these benefits only when they are provided for in a reciprocal treaty. So we are worried that

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

if we don't reach agreement by May 31 our carriers might lose these exemptions. To avoid this, we might exchange notes in which we say that, pending the ratification of the new agreement, the clause concerning customs continues in effect until the new agreement enters into force. There will be no time to ratify the agreement in time to have these exemptions, even if it were entered into promptly. So we will want to be sure we are not going to add this difficulty. I think this is in your interest and I have a draft note here that will accomplish this. I will give you a copy and you can give me an answer in a few days.

Numbering of Negotiations Documents

Mr. Loy: I think that is a document we would like to study. I think maybe just for clarity, it would be desirable to label documents so that our reference to them as the days go by will be clear. Let us call your draft agreement Italian Document #1. Your proposed route statement is Italian Document #2, and this customs note is Italian Document #3. The US draft agreement we can label US Document #1 and the US Route Objectives, US Document #2.

We will study your Doc. #3, but it raises a question about timing. It does not trouble me to contemplate a situation where we have agreed on a new agreement but all the ratifying processes have not been completed. That is something we can provide for. But if by May 31 we have not achieved the first of these points we would be interested in your view as to how you see these operations continuing. Under what kind of an arrangement would they continue and in what manner?

Ambassador Capomazza: I do not give any significance to this paper but it is merely a matter of housekeeping. It is not a matter we want to consider today.

Mr. Loy: I am prepared not to consider it today, but I think this is a subject we have given some thought to and the question of services without an agreement is a question that has troubled us considerably. I think before we get done here we will want to give you our views on this because they are quite relevant and I think makes it quite important that our discussions be a success.

Ambassador Capomazza: I think I am encouraged to say a few more things. Mr. Loy has spoken in a very elegant way of American air policies and their interests. I would like to talk about Italian policies and interests.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

When I explained why we had denounced the treaty, I made reference to past history. I also added that I was not going to make this argument over and over, so let's leave it behind us. We have denounced this agreement because it could not work. For many years the Italians could not enjoy many of the rights which the US had given Italy. The fact is we never materialized these rights. That is why we say that the agreement is dead. We want a new agreement. In order to have a new agreement, we need a meeting of the minds to try to find points of agreement regarding our respective necessities. I say let's first discuss the route schedules. In our schedule we tried to preserve a situation where our carriers would enjoy a more balanced possibility to exploit the rights to be granted by the new agreement. So I think I am perfectly entitled to say let's get down to business and see what we can do on our route schedules.

Why Italy Was Dissatisfied

You have never given us any proper answer why we did not get the route between Montreal and Los Angeles. I know! Because we didn't give you the famous statistics. This is the root of our dissatisfaction. I think we would perhaps decide to meet again, say tomorrow, and then decide to start discussing in a practical way the plan of routes that we have presented to you. We understand what you say, that this is a package deal. But you know the German saying that to peel a sack of potatoes you have to peel a potato at a time. It is a package deal, but let's start with one item and see what happens.

We would also like to have a more precise idea of what your route schedule means. You said what it would include in general terms, but not in specific terms. You say you want more flexibility. Where is the flexibility for us? We have to go to New York and come back, we go to Chicago and come back. We have no flexiblity. That is why we think you should take our route schedule, point by point, and discuss it.

You also spoke about capacity. We know you have it with other countries. But we did not sign the Bermuda agreement. We signed a Bermuda agreement with you in 1948. On May 31 it is dead and we want to have a new policy. We do not want to restrict you and our policy will not restrict you. You have the policy of the Bermuda policy and we have policies with other countries which are not Bermuda. Capacities are determined by both parties. Now and then you praise Alitalia. But you act as if your carriers are afraid of Alitalia. Alitalia is the only one not allowed to do what other carriers can do.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Difficulties Foreseen

Mr. Loy: Mr. Ambassador it is clear that our problem is every bit as difficult as we both thought it would be. You spoke of a meeting of the minds and the need to have a meeting of the minds. That is exactly what I have been probing, and, that is, to see if we can complete these discussions with a meeting of the minds. I think we may well have a fruitful discussion today but I want you to understand the difficult position you have put us in. You would like to have a meaningful discussion of your route requests because you believe that is the very alpha of our problems. That is the very essence of the difficulty that led you to denounce the agreement and required a new agreement. I think that is understandable and there is some logic to that approach. But it is very difficult to go very far in discussing what conceivable routes might be in the package of routes we may exchange when, for example, we don't know how many US carriers would operate. It is difficult to talk about an agreement. Without an agreement there are no routes of any sort. You say to us, let us start to work on routes and maybe the other things will work out as we go along. Well, we will consider that proposal although not much I have heard today makes me very sanguine that these other things will work out. We are prepared to start from scratch, write an agreement from the beginning. We have indicated we are prepared to consider a route exchange from the beginning. We also hope to get out of that exchange essentially what we have in that paper, but we are prepared to start at the beginning. It is difficult to discuss even the first route request when it is not clear we have the basis for a satisfactory understanding. That is the dilemma it will put us in. Perhaps it doesn't matter how we go about this but there is a great risk in misconstruing unless these things are made quite clear. At the moment it is clear if we talk about routes that we will be talking about routes without knowing under what arrangement these routes would be operated. However, let's leave the matter there.

The meeting was adjourned until the next day at 3:00.

Attachment: Appendix A

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES - ITALIAN FOUNDATIONS
[illegible]

	(1) MON. FEB. 20	(2) TUES. FEB. 21	(3) WED. FEB. 22	(4) FRI. FEB. 24	(5) MON. FEB. 27	(6) WED. MAR. 1	(7) FRI. MAR. 3	(8) MON. MAR. 6	(9) TUES. MAR. 7	(10) WED. MAR. 8
[illegible]										
LAZ	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[illegible]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[illegible]		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[illegible]	X	X	X LATE	X	X LATE	X LATE		X LATE		X LATE
[illegible]	X	X	X	X	X LATE	X LATE	X	X LATE	X	X
[illegible]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[illegible]	X	X	X	X	X LATE	X	X	X	X	X
[illegible]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[illegible]			X							X
[illegible]						X				
[illegible]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

DECLASSIFIED

	(1) TUES. DEC. 4	(2) WED. DEC. 12	(3) THURS. DEC. 13	(4) FRI. DEC. 21	(5) MON. DEC. 17	(6) WED. MAR. 1	(7) FRI. MAR. 3	(8) MON. MAR. 6	(9) TUES. MAR. 7	(10) WED. MAR. 8
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[redacted]	X	X	X	X						
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X				
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[redacted]	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X
[redacted]				X	X					
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
[redacted]	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X